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Changes in age structure that results from demographic transition have economic 
consequences. This paper identifies the period of potential window of opportunity 
or demographic dividends created by Nigeria’s demographic transition. This is 
done by simulating the period of the demographic window of opportunity in 
Nigeria. In a simulation covering 1950 – 2050 our results reveal that Nigeria 
entered the window of opportunity in 2003 and will last beyond year 2050. The 
highest benefit will accrue in years 2032 and 2033 when the dividend can 
account for more than 10% of the growth of GDP per capita even if the current 
performance scenario continues to exist. However, the paper notes that the 
demographic dividend is not automatically realized and Nigeria needs to embark 
on strategies that will develop her human capital and position her towards not 
only capturing the first dividend but the second dividend as well.
Keywords: demographic transition, demographic dividends, national 
transfer accounts (NTA), economic lifecycle, economic support 
ratio
Résumé
Les changements dans la structure d'âge qui provient de la transition démo-
graphique ont des conséquences économiques. Ce papier identifie la période de 
fenêtre potentielle d'opportunité ou de dividendes démographiques créés par la 
transition démographique du Nigeria. C'est fait en simulant la période de la fenê-
tre démographique d'opportunité au Nigeria. Dans une simulation couvrant 1950 
– 2050. Nos résultats révèlent que le Nigeria est entré dans la fenêtre d'opportu-
nité en 2003 et durera au-delà de l'année 2050. Le plus haut avantage s'accu-
mulera au cours des années 2032 et 2033 où le dividende peut représenter plus 
de 10 % de la croissance de PIB par habitant même si le scénario de performance 
actuel continue à exister. Pourtant, le papier note que le dividende démo-
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graphique n'est pas automatiquement réalisé et le Nigeria doit entreprendre des 
stratégies qui développeront sa capitale humaine et la placeront vers le fait de 
non capturer seulement le premier dividende, mais le deuxième dividende aussi.
Mots clé: la transition démographique, les dividendes démographiques, les 
comptes de transfert nationaux (NTA), life cyclé économique, le 
rapport de soutien économique
Introduction
Nigeria recently developed and 
adopted Vision 20-20201 aimed at fast-
tracking her growth desire over the 
next ten years and lead the country to 
become one of the top 20 economies in 
the world by year 2020. Attainment of 
this vision requires discerning and 
annexing various opportunities at the 
disposal of the country for economic 
development. While population struc-
ture could be an important factor, 
Nigeria has experienced slow demo-
graphic transition. For 40 years after 
independence, the country experienced 
high fertility rate with the number of 
children per woman in excess of 6. This 
was combined with high mortality rates 
which resulted in a high ratio of children 
in the population. The demographic 
position is changing however with 
crude birth and death rates as well as 
fertility rates falling and is expected to 
continue falling for the next few dec-
ades (United Nations, 2007). With 
declining fertility and mortality, Nigeria 
like every other country of the world is 
in the process of demographic transi-
tion. As countries move through the 
demographic transition, size of the 
working age population mechanically 
increases (Bloom et al, 2007). 
Changes in the age structure of a 
country can significantly affect its eco-
nomic performance because individual’s 
economic behaviour differs at different 
point in life. The resultant increase in 
the ratio of the working age population 
as both fertility and mortality declines 
yield increases in aggregate income lev-
els thereby creating a window of 
opportunity, during which economies 
may benefit from a temporary increase 
in the working age share of the popula-
tion (Queiroz and Turra, 2010). The 
characterizing opportunity associated 
with this changing population age struc-
ture, occurs at different points in time 
in the history of any nation and is 
referred to as demographic dividends 
(Mason et al., 2009). 
Recent studies have however 
focused on the consequences of 
changes in age structure of population 
on economic growth and development 
(Cutler et al, 1990; Bloom, et al, 2010a; 
Lee and Mason 2011, Lee, and Mason, 
2006; Mason, 2005). However, there 
are limited studies examining this issue 
for Nigeria . Of paramount interest in 
this regard is the economic opportunity 
which changing population age struc-
ture offers nations as they experience 
demographic transition. It has been 
argued that rapid growth in the propor-
tion of population in working ages con-
tributes to high ratio of effective 
producers to effective consumers or 
the economic support ratio. At some 
stage of the demographic transition, 
1. This means that Nigeria hopes to be among the top 20 countries in the world by year 2020
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countries experience high economic 
support ratios and given the growth of 
productivity, economic support ratio 
increases growth of per capita income. 
The period during which growth of 
economic support ratio leads to 
increase in economic growth is called 
first demographic dividend. While the 
first dividend arises because of the rapid 
growth of the productive population 
relative to the consuming population, 
the second dividend arises because 
population aging provides a powerful 
force for saving and asset accumulation.
Nigeria’s population has grown 
extensively in the past years from 88 
million in 1991 to 140 million in 2006. 
This is not unconnected with the rapid 
development and modernisation which 
brought about improvements in 
hygiene and advances in health and edu-
cation in the country. By 2050, the pop-
ulation of Nigeria is expected to reach 
288.7 million (United Nations, 2007). 
Although crude death rate declined 
from 24 to 16 between 1990 and 2008, 
crude birth rate (CBR) has not wit-
nessed the same rapid reduction indi-
cating a rapid population growth in the 
country as the CBR was is still 40 in 
2008 (Table 1). This profile suggests 
that more people will be entering the 
working age population in the nearest 
future. The structure of the population 
reveals that by 2009, the working age is 
43 % of the population and is expected 
to reach around 58 % by 2050. If this 
working-age population is totally trans-
formed into educated, skilful and 
employed, it would be contributory for 
increasing the national economic 
growth. An understanding of the eco-
nomic lifecycle can shape policies in the 
continent on how to better enjoy the 
demographic dividend or window of 
opportunity that the change in popula-
tion structure will open to Nigeria 
(Bloom et al, 2010) and prepare the 
ground on how Nigeria can benefit 
from the second demographic dividend, 
through the development of appropri-
ate institutions and provision of the 
right incentives.
Studies such as Renteria et al (2009) 
and Queroz et al (2006) have estimated 
demographic dividend for Spain and 
Brazil, respectively using the national 
Transfer Accounts (NTA) framework 
with informative policy implications. 
The NTA approach works through the 
construction of an age-specific national 
economic input-output system (Mason 
et al, 2010). The accounts allocate con-
sumption and production to single years 
of age. Thus, they facilitate understand-
ing of how changes in a population’s age 
structure—a product of changes in fer-
tility, mortality, and migration—poten-
tially affect the extent to which there is 
Table 1 Demographic Indicators for Nigeria
1970 1990 2008
Crude death rate 24 20 16
Crude birth rate 47 46 40
Life expectancy 40 45 48
Source: UNDP (2009) 
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a surplus of production over consump-
tion and hence a potential for under-
standing the structure of life cycle 
deficits across age groups and how 
these deficits can be financed. 
This paper thus utilises the frame-
work to estimate the economic support 
ratio and productivity for the country. 
This is subsequently used to simulate 
the period of the economic support 
ratio for Nigeria over the period 1950- 
2050. This is subsequently used to 
examine the period when the demo-
graphic window of opportunity shall be 
available to Nigeria. The paper is organ-
ized as follows. In the next section we 
present brief literature review followed 
by the analytical framework, method 
and data used for the study. The simula-
tion results and analysis of estimates of 
the first dividend is presented next. We 
conclude with a discussion of results, 
policy options and some limitations of 
the analysis.
Literature review
Every society continuously experience 
changes in the age structure of her pop-
ulation. The continuous change is what 
enables a country to experience demo-
graphic transition over time. Demo-
graphic transition is the transition from 
a largely rural agrarian society with high 
fertility and mortality rates to a pre-
dominantly urban industrial society with 
low fertility and mortality rates (Lee 
and Mason, 2006). Cutler et al. (1990) 
pointed out that the changing age-
structure has the potential to yield ben-
efits to a society for two reasons. First, 
it lowers the dependency ratio, which 
means that more resources can be 
invested in the economy. Second, the 
increase in longevity improves the pop-
ulation’s savings behaviour, thus creat-
ing positive effects on income 
levels.While most developed countries 
have largely completed their demo-
graphic transition, developing countries 
are still in the process. Nations which 
are in the middle part of the demo-
graphic transition are potentially in a 
particularly favourable position to enjoy 
the demographic dividend as regards 
the economy, because of the presence 
of a relatively large working age popula-
tion. 
Many studies including those by 
Bloom et al. (2010a); Kinugasa, (2004); 
as well as Williamson and Higgins, 
(2001) Bloom and Canning, (2001) and 
Bloom and Williamson (1998) have 
shown the significant effects of these 
demographic window of opportunity 
on economic growth. The study by 
Bloom and Williamson (1998) con-
cluded that about one-third of East 
Asia’s increase in per capita income was 
due to the demographic dividend while 
another by Mason (2001) using growth 
accounting methods estimated that the 
dividend accounted for about one-
fourth of the region’s economic growth. 
Subsequent studies like Cutler et al., 
1990; Lee et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2001; 
Mason, 2005 and Mason (2005) have 
also found that dividends are important 
for economic growth in many countries 
with the potential of contributing as 
much as one to two percentage points 
of growth of per capita income for dif-
ferent developed and developing coun-
tries. However, despite considerable 
potentials, many African countries are 
yet to reap demographic dividends 
because they are yet to enter the win-
dow of opportunity created by the 
changing age structure of the popula-
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tion (see Bloom et al., 2007) 
Two phases of the demographic div-
idends have been identified in the litera-
ture (Queroz and Turra, 2010). The 
first demographic dividend is usually 
related to a temporary increase in the 
share of the population that is of work-
ing age and can effectively be measured 
by increase in the ratio of producers to 
consumers in the population (Mason, 
2005; Mason and Feng, 2005)2. The 
second dividend arises to the extent 
that consumers and policymakers are 
forward-looking and respond effec-
tively to the demographic changes. This 
emerges in succession to the first divi-
dend and is related to the creation of 
wealth that arises in response to popu-
lation aging (Queiroz, Turra, and Perez, 
2006). One feature of the second 
demographic dividend is that if the win-
dow of its opportunity is taken, it turns 
out to be indefinite. However, the mag-
nitude of its effect depends largely on 
how wealth is created during the 
period of first dividend (Mason, 2005). 
With a rise of the elderly dependent 
population on the horizon, consump-
tion in the future can be maintained 
only through the accumulation of 
wealth in some form. One possibility is 
that individuals and/or firms and gov-
ernments acting on behalf of consumers 
accumulate capital. The second divi-
dend is thus the possible attainment of 
sustainable development based on 
accumulation of assets by the elderly 
that propel economic development. 
Soyibo, (2011) found that the pace 
of demographic dividend differs in the 
different regions of the Sub-Saharan 
Africa. While it started first in Southern 
Africa in the 1970s, followed by Eastern 
Africa in the mid eighties, it did not start 
until the late 1990s and early 2000 in 
West Africa and Central Africa respec-
tively. If this pace is compared to the 
countries of South Central and South-
east Asia it is observed that demo-
graphic transition started later in SSAs 
as many parts of sub-Saharan Africa 
have seen almost no decrease in tradi-
tionally high fertility rates. The implica-
tion is that sub-Saharan Africa has 
experienced an extremely sluggish 
demographic transition. Traditionally 
high fertility rates and large family sizes 
have persisted in the face of improve-
ments in infant and child mortality. Ross 
(2004) submits that although Sub-Saha-
ran Africa is just starting to enter its 
window, if declining fertility rates can 
be sustained over the next several dec-
ades and if respective SSA governments 
take pro-active actions that follow, to 
some extent, those of East Asia, the 
dividends may become real rather than 
potential. Incidentally, Eastwood and 
Lipton (2012) submit that in contrast to 
Asia, there is an alarming implication of 
continuing high levels of natural 
increase in SSA population in the face of 
low savings rates and low capital pro-
ductivity. This will likely render current 
consumption per person in most of SSA 
unsustainable and matters can be made 
worse if man-made capital cannot read-
ily be substituted for natural capital, or 
if environmental resources in these 
countries are progressively 
degraded(perhaps below a critical 
threshold) because it is used by more 
and more people.
While the demographic transition of 
a society will eventually bring her to this 
potential, the dividends are neither 
2. This ratio is called the economic support ratio (see Mason, 2007)
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automatic nor a guarantee for improve-
ment in standard of living (D’Adamo 
(2004). According to Wongboonsin and 
Guest (2004) demographic dividend 
occurs only once during a demographic 
transition and lasts for just a few dec-
ades. The implication is that the open-
ing of the window of opportunity for 
reaping demographic dividend is transi-
tory as populations age structure will 
continue to change until when there 
will be a reduced proportion of work-
ing age people and an enlarged propor-
tion of elderly people. This means that 
countries must exploit while it lasts 
(Bloom and Canning 2003). While Bon-
gaarts and Bulatao (1999) concluded 
that Sub-Saharan Africa countries may 
not likely reap the demographic divi-
dend, Bloom et al (2007) were able to 
show that most Sub-Saharan countries 
have the potential to reap the benefits 
of the demographic dividend, however 
conditional on presence of solid institu-
tional settings, essential for its realiza-
tion. These institutions according to 
Bloom et al (2007) include in a broader 
sense, infrastructure (health care sys-
tems, schooling, roads, transport), and 
a formal labour market with unions as 
well as laws protecting both employees 
and employers
In this regard, it has been acknowl-
edged that the absence of quality insti-
tutions will make demographic 
transition ineffective in realizing the 
demographic dividend (Lee, Lee, & 
Mason, 2006; Bloom et al, 2003). For 
example, Carvalho and Wong, (2005) 
estimated that the demographic transi-
tion of the Brazil will experience this 
demographic window of opportunity 
until year 2045 from which the first div-
idend arises. Turra and Queiroz, (2005) 
argue that the temporary benefits of 
population change in the case of Brazil 
were mitigated by absence of appropri-
ate policies.
It has been argued by Mason and 
Lee (2006) that the second component 
could be influenced by factors such as 
human and physical capital as well as 
the strength of political and economic 
institutions, while for an open economy, 
income per worker might also be influ-
enced by income earned on assets 
invested abroad. Bloom et al, (2010b) 
submits that the rate of adaptation of 
Nigeria to the changing population age 
structure in securing high growth might 
be slowed down if the right policy envi-
ronment is absent. This conclusion 
tends to be from past experience as 
revealed by studies such as Mason 
(2003) who concludes that “population 
policies and programmes were a suc-
cess in East Asia is an inescapable con-
clusion”. Thus the need for policy 
makers to respond ahead of time in 
order to boost the benefits of tempo-
rary increases in the working age popu-
lation have been stressed (Carvalho and 
Wong, 1995). The absence of appropri-
ate policies can inhibit temporary bene-
fits of population changes and heighten 
unfavourable effects of population 
aging. It has been projected that Nigeria 
and a number of other African coun-
tries have very strong growth of the 
share of the working age population, 
but they still suffer from institutional 
deficiencies. According to Mason 
(2005), the ability to reap from demo-
graphic dividend must involve a con-
scious policy effort of creation of 
adequate opportunities by the labour 
market for the growing working age 
population and existence of developed 
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financial market to fulfil individual’s 
desire to save are fundamental to reap-
ing the benefit of the dividends. This 
was complemented by Soyibo (2011) 
that such policies must include employ-
ment generation, infrastructural devel-
opment, health and education policies 
and programmes that create conducive 
environment for citizens’ empower-
ment.
Lutz (2008) suggests that SSA coun-
tries should follow the steps of the 
countries that have experienced demo-
graphic transition. This is because while 
high population growth will expand 
labour force, it will not boost economic 
growth unless human capital is 
expanded commensurately. RAND 
(2002) therefore argues that African 
countries must act with urgency in 
implementing policies that will assist in 
reaping the benefits of demographic 
dividend as they have a time limited 
opportunity to capitalize on reduced 
fertility and the maturing of young pop-
ulations before this boom generation 
reaches nonworking age. For Senegal, 
Dramani and Fahd (2012) found that in 
order to be able to reap these divi-
dends, they suggest that government 
needs to make important choices 
between investment in education, in 
firms (subsidies), household consump-
tion and many other sectors. For 
instance, encouraging the firms by fiscal 
alleviation could allow them to increase 
their investments, cooperate with the 
educational system, helping Govern-
ment and improving in achieving its 
educational policy.
There are two main analytical 
approaches in the literature of demo-
graphic dividend which are the statisti-
cal analysis of aggregate data by Bloom 
et al, (2003) and the simulation analysis 
that has been explored by Lee and 
Mason (2006) and Mason (2001). While 
the first approach focuses on estimating 
growth model using Barro growth 
framework (conditional convergence). 
The second uses micro-data based esti-
mates of the age profiles of consump-
tion, f(x), and labour earning, g(x), to 
generate the economic support ratio 
(Dramani and Fahd, 2012). This proce-
dure uses estimates of the effective 
number of producers and consumers to 
calculate the economic support ratio of 
the country. The parameters of speci-
fied equations are based on NTA and 
other empirical research. The direction 
of the results from both frameworks 




The estimation of the first demographic 
dividend requires age profile of con-
sumption, labour income and popula-
tion age distributions for a particular 
country. These are calculated using the 
NTA approach (NTA, 2010). In order 
to calculate the effective number of 
consumers and producers, we have to 
construct the age profile of consump-
tion and production of the population in 
year (Cutler et al. 1990; Mason, 2005) 
for Nigeria. Here Consumption is 
defined to include both private and 
public consumption. Private consump-
tion is estimated from the 2004 
National Living Standard Survey (NLSS) 
of Nigeria using direct estimation of the 
reported values to get the mean con-
sumption value by age. Public consump-
tion estimates however are based on 
the total government spending as 
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reported by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN, 2007) as well as other 
information that were used to allocate 
public spending on education, health, 
and other public expenditure. In order 
to determine the productivity age pro-
file in the country, this study assumes 
that productivity is reflected by the 
labour income structure within the 
country. Labour income estimates are 
then based on the NLSS survey since it 
also include adequate information on 
earnings of individual employees, return 
to labour in family businesses, self-
employed income and other forms of 
labour income. 
The data used in estimating the pro-
files is the 2004 National Living Stand-
ard Survey NLSS as well as some official 
government statistical documents espe-
cially on public health and education 
expenditure. NLSS was conducted by 
the Nigerian National Bureau of Statis-
tics and is a nationally representative 
survey covering 18,000 households and 
90,000 individuals The estimated pro-
files were adjusted to match the values 
of the National Income and Products 
Accounts of Nigeria for 2004 (NBS, 
2007). After the base profiles of the 
consumption and labour income had 
been determined for year 2004, we 
then simulate for the period 1950 to 
2050. In doing this, the per capita values 
of consumption and labour income in 
Nigeria determined from the NLSS data 
and government records are then used 
to derive the country estimates by mul-
tiplying the per capita value for each age 
by the population of that age in the dif-
ferent years within our scope (i.e. 
1950-2050). The population data for 
the period of analysis was obtained 
from UN population projections 
(United Nations, 20073). Population 
projections are based on medium vari-
ant on total fertility contained in World 
Population Prospects.
Method
This study applies the methodology 
proposed by Mason and Lee (2006) and 
Mason (2007) to estimate the first divi-
dend for Nigeria from 1950 to 2050, as 
has been applied in other countries like 
Brazil (Queiroz et al., 2006) and Spain 
(Renteria et al, 2010). This paper thus 
utilizes the NTA approach to estimate 
the demographic dividend for Nigeria. 
The NTA approach has two main fea-
tures in which first, it emphasises con-
sumption rather than income as the 
outcome variable and second, it pro-
vides a new theoretical approach to 
modelling consumption and capital 
accumulation. This is done by exploiting 
estimates of age profiles of consump-
tion and labour income. We follow 
Mason and Lee (2006) and Mason 
(2007) to formalize the demographic 
dividends as expressed in equation 1
                                  (1) 
Where 
Yt is the total output,
Lt is effective number of produc-
ers, and 
Nt is the effective number of 
consumers. 
Equation 1 states that GDP per capita 
comprises of productivity (GDP per 
3. Although we are aware that there are newer estimates of population projection by United 
Nation, we have utilized 2006 estimates because it is closer to the survey period of the 
NLSS data which was collected in 2004
Y t( )
 t( )
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worker) and the age structure. The 
equation further expresses output per 
effective consumer as equal to output 
per effective producer and the eco-
nomic support ratio (i.e. effective pro-
ducers per effective consumers). The 
equation can be used to decompose 
economic growth to reveal the rela-
tionship of population growth with 
GDP per capita growth. We obtain the 
growth rates of equation 1 by taking the 
log of both sides of equation 1 and dif-
ferentiating it in respect with time to 
give equation 2
                                     (2)
Equation 2 reveals that the growth rate 
of output is equal to the sum of two 
components, which are the equivalents 
of the two demographic dividends. The 
first dividend corresponds to the 
growth of the economic support ratio. 
This is the difference between the 
growth in the number of effective pro-
ducers and the growth in the number of 
effective consumers. The second com-
ponent is the second dividend which is 
the rate of growth of productivity, and 
is calculated by the growth of the ratio 
of income per worker. In the NTA 
approach, the age profiles of consump-
tion and labour income are calculated 
for each age in the population to give 
the age profiles of consumption and 
labour income. In the period of simula-
tion for the demographic transition and 
dynamics, the associated economic sup-
port ratio is calculated holding the 
shape of the age profiles of consump-
tion and labour income fixed. Equation 
3 gives the definition of the economic 
support ratio.
                    (3)
Equation 3 indicates that the economic 
support ratio measures the effect of age 
structure on the capacity of a popula-
tion to contribute to current produc-
tion. This is based on the belief that the 
age profiles of production and con-
sumption reflect a wide variety of 
behavioural, institutional, and cultural 
factors and thus will affect the produc-
tivity in different economies. Demo-
graphic dividend is thus defined in this 
paper as the growth rate of the eco-
nomic support ratio. It should be noted 
that given labour productivity, 1% 
increase in support ratio leads to 1% 
increase in per capita growth (Mason, 
2011)
Results 
The evolution of age structure in 
Nigeria is presented in Figure 1 to show 
how the demographic transition 
evolved during the period of analysis 
between 1950 and 2050.Nigeria in 
2010 was a very young population with 
the proportion of under 29 year olds 
representing more than 55 percent of 
the population. Nigeria experienced 
high fertility and mortality rates over 
the years. Fertility however started 
declining since the 1980s although 
slowly (Bloom et al, 2010b). It is 
expected that both crude birth and 
death rates will continue to fall beyond 
2010 and should affect the ratio of the 
working population to total population, 
which will increase, thereby creating 
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the country. Between 1950 and 2000, 
total fertility rate fell by more than half 
and was expected to fall even more by 
2005. This will see the population shift-
ing away from the very young popula-
tion structure (figure 1) and by 2050, 
the country will have a larger propor-
tion in the working age. 
This relationship between fertility and 
mortality rates has thus opened the 
window of opportunity. The factors 
that shaped the dividend lie in the rela-
tionship between the number of effec-
tive producers as well as the number of 
effective consumers within the coun-
try. This is derived by the age profiles of 
labour income and consumption in the 
country. Figure 2 presents the esti-
mated age profiles of production and 
consumption for Nigeria in 2004. The 
figure indicates that on the average, 
consumption is higher than labour 
income for the dependency ages. In the 
case of the children, consumption at 
each age level by Nigerians exceed 
their labour income until 33 years of 
age when the labour income are more 
than the consumptions on the average, 
This is the situation until an average 
person reaches age 63 when old age 
dependency effectively starts with 
labour income falling rapidly and falling 
short of covering consumption expend-
iture. The estimates reveal that the sur-
plus in the productive years is not 
enough to cover the deficit from the 
dependent years leading to lifecycle 
deficits (Olaniyan et al, 2010). The 
results are consistent with the general 
understanding of the lifecycle where 
lifecycle starts with child dependency to 
a period of production surplus and end-
ing with old-age deficit (Lee and Mason 
2012).
Figure 1 Population age structure for Nigeria, 1950-2050
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Once the life cycle deficit is found, it is 
possible to estimate the evolution of 
the first and the second demographic 
dividends. As described above, demo-
graphic dividend is determined by the 
economic support ratio which is the 
ratio of effective number of producers 
to effective numbers of consumers. 
This is presented in figure 3. The figure 
reveals that the growth rate of effective 
producers peaked at about 3% 
between 2020 and 2030 from a rate of 
2.6 percent in year 2010. The growth 
of effective producers will eventually 
start declining from 2023 and by 2050 it 
will only be growing at just above 1.8%.
This difference in the two rates 
determines the window of opportu-
nity. The first demographic dividend for 
Nigeria dividend is shown in Figure 4 
which is drawn from the growth rate of 
the difference between the number of 
effective producers and effective con-
sumers (i.e. the economic support 
ratio). The results indicate that as the 
economic support ratio increases, the 
dividend starts to increase rapidly and 
when the economic support ratio 
decreases the effect of the dividend also 
declines. Figure 4 indicates that from 
1987 to 2031, the demographic situa-
tion is favourable. In fact, since the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, as 
changes in the economic support ratio 
has a strong effect on output per 
worker. The ratio increased by 52% 
between 2003 and 2031.
Our result further reveals that the 
country only started experiencing the 
first dividend in year 2003 and will last 
beyond 2050 (Figure 4). Before 2003, 
the existing age structure represented a 
drag on growth in per capita income. 
The demographic transition process has 
Figure 2 Per capita consumption and labour income, Nigeria, 2004
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been a drag in the country until 2003 
when it contributed to the negative 
growth of the economy. 
Figure 3 Growth rates of effective consumers and effective producers, Nigeria 1950-2050
Figure 4 First demographic dividend, Nigeria, 1950-2050
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Discussion
Economic growth and performance of 
any country is dependent on the output 
from the productive population. The 
productive population which is often 
regarded as those within the working 
age generates the income and thus the 
surplus for the economy. The results of 
this paper reveal that in contrast to the 
general understanding of dependency 
years being the ages not within the 
working age (i.e. 15-65 years) the child 
dependency actually extends to more 
than double the perceived age. Child 
dependency in Nigeria does not end 
until age 334. In the same vein, old-age 
dependency does not start on the aver-
age before age 63. The implication is 
that the ages for which an average 
Nigerian enjoys lifecycle surplus span 
30 years between ages 33 years when 
income exceeds consumption and age 
63 year when consumption once again 
exceeds income.
The implication is that when output 
from the effective producers is equal to 
the consumption by the effective con-
sumers in 2003, the economic support 
ratio becomes positive and more is 
being produced than consumed. This 
gap between the period when output 
from the effective producers is equal to 
the consumption by the effective con-
sumers creates the window of opportu-
nity or demographic dividend for 
Nigeria. The bigger the gap between 
the when output from the effective 
producers and the consumption by the 
effective consumers, the bigger the div-
idend becomes and vice versa. 
Although the growth of effective pro-
ducers declined between 2023 and 
2050, it will still be higher than the 
growth in the number of effective con-
sumers but the gap between the two 
will keep reducing as the dividend dissi-
pates. 
In fact between 1950 and 1995, age 
structure of the Nigerian population 
actually reduced the potential eco-
nomic growth of Nigeria by as much as 
0.2 percent. However, since 2003, the 
dividend has turned positive and shall 
remain positive till 2050 which is the 
end of our simulation. The prospect for 
the dividend reaches its peak in 2031 
and 2032 before it starts to decline. It 
should be noted however, that the divi-
dend is transitory and will end at some 
point in time. Although we do not know 
when the dividend will become a drag 
but findings from other countries indi-
cate that the first dividend always last 
for between 30 to 60 years. For exam-
ple, while it lasted an average of 29.7 
years in the industrial countries, the 
period is expected to be much higher in 
developing countries with an average of 
47.9 years in Latin America and 52.3 in 
the Middle East and North African 
countries (Querroiz and Turra, 2010). 
While the demographic backdrop 
for a demographic dividend can be con-
fidently predicted and quantified over 
the medium term with a high degree of 
accuracy through population projec-
tions, the ability to take advantage of 
the demographic situation is related to 
human resources and other economic 
policies (Wongboonsin et al. 2005).
4. The age represents the age at which production is equal to consumption. Early age 
represent age at which young adults starts to produce as much as they consume while 
later stage represent the age after which they no longer produce as much as they 
consume.
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What is important therefore, is the 
need to harness the dividend, some of 
which can be used to increase con-
sumption, raise current standards of liv-
ing, and some can be invested in human 
or physical capital or in stronger institu-
tions that will lead to permanently 
higher economic growth (Mason and 
Lee, 2006). In order to assess the size 
of these effects it is useful to compare 
the first dividend to the rates of eco-
nomic growth achieved during the 
same periods. The average growth of 
the country between 2003 and 2007 
which was 6.9 percent (CBN, 2008), 
and when compared with the prospect 
of demographic dividend, our estimates 
reveal that the first demographic divi-
dend was already becoming a catalyst in 
the observed economic growth of the 
country. However, the contribution is 
expected to increase over the years and 
will contribute as much as 18 percent 
to economic growth by year 2030 and 
about 10 percent to the GDP growth in 
2050 if the current average growth rate 
exists at the time5.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the issue of 
demographic transition in Nigeria and 
how changes in population age struc-
ture can open windows of opportunity 
for rapid increase in economic growth. 
The paper found that population age 
structure is important for economic 
growth because it can have a perma-
nent effect on consumption by influenc-
ing the accumulation of assets but the 
outcome is highly policy-depend-
ent.This study has shown that the 
demographic transition in Nigeria is 
capable of leading to more rapid 
growth in output per capita if the right 
policies are put in place. The current 
transition being experienced in the 
country suggests that the first popula-
tion dividend offers a positive develop-
ment opportunity during the coming 
decades.
In order to harness the opportunity 
for economic growth however, the 
opportunity must be grabbed while it is 
still available. Nigeria thus needs a pol-
icy environment to encourage growth. 
The present high unemployment rates 
have to be tackled if the increase in 
economic support ratio will be produc-
tively utilised. This will include embark-
ing on adequate employment policies to 
accommodate the increase in working 
population. An increase in employment 
in the country will require adequate 
infrastructure availability.
If the capacity of the working popu-
lation has to be harnessed, then the 
human capital in the country must be 
improved upon. This involves the 
development of education and health in 
the country so as to improve the overall 
productivity within the country. The 
education system in the country must 
emphasise the right relevance entre-
preneurship and private sector employ-
ment. Government must thus invest 
heavily on the right education, health 
and human resource development for 
all her citizens. The implication is the 
need to develop the country’s human 
capital so that the large number of 
working population can have the neces-
sary skill to lead the economic growth 
of the country. Specifically, the following 
issues are important. Such notions lead 
5. This is based on the assumption that the GDP per capita grows at an average of 10 percent 
per annum.
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to a question of how Nigeria should 
modify its curriculum to equip its 
human resources with these qualifica-
tions to sustain the competitiveness of 
the economy.
Since the period of the first divi-
dend will also generate a high surplus 
for those within the working popula-
tion, then there is need to develop a 
good macroeconomic policy to encour-
age savings, investment and asset acqui-
sition which will in turn position the 
country towards reaping the second 
demographic dividend when that win-
dow of opportunity eventually opens. 
Individuals will only save and invest in a 
right policy environment with low infla-
tion, transparency, efficiency of the 
financial institutions and enforcement of 
the rule of law. Individuals must be 
encouraged to invest as they earn and 
generate more savings from the low 
dependency ratio. The savings must 
however be invested in such a way as to 
increase the capacity of the current and 
future labour force to participate fully in 
a skills-based economy. The financial 
sector must thus be improved upon and 
the right policies should be put in place 
to develop the pension assets, capital 
market, financial literacy and domestic 
investment environment. An increase in 
working population over the next few 
decades will eventually lead to a high 
population of the old age later. Social 
protection for the elderly must thus be 
put in place so the country will not end 
up with elderly that are destitute. This 
would involve an increase in pension 
coverage and free health for the elderly. 
The pension system should emphasise 
an asset-based pension systems and 
reduce the reliance on public pensions. 
In the same vein, since many elderly in 
Nigeria are still engaged in the labour 
market, policies must be put in place to 
improve access to labour markets for 
elderly.
While we have taken all efforts to 
be consistent as much as possible, the 
results presented here are suggestive as 
they can be explored further. First, all of 
the simulations have been basedon age 
profiles of consumption and labour 
income for Nigeria for 2004. There is 
the possibility that the profiles might 
vary overtime and across different pol-
icy regimes. This might influence the 
actual future values of the dividend that 
the country will enjoy. The absence of 
series of comprehensive national living 
standard surveys for the country limit 
the ability of this study to examine how 
the profile might vary over time. 
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